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The JOURNAL of ACCOUNTANCY
Official Organ of the American Institute of Accountants
a. P. richardson,

Editor

EDITORIAL
The tenth annual meeting of the Ameri
can Institute of Accountants, held at
Atlantic City, September 21 and 22,
1926, was a striking demonstration of the steady upward growth of
the accounting profession in America. The discussions were
conducted on a high plane and throughout all the sessions there
was manifest a dignified esprit de corps. Accountants from all
parts of this country and visitors from Canada participated in the
activities. The results of the meeting will doubtless be helpful to
the entire profession. Several matters of far-reaching importance
to accountancy were considered and it was evident that the intent
at all times was to advance the interests of the whole profession.
The paper read by P. W. R. Glover, which appeared in the Oc
tober issue of The Journal of Accountancy, was an instructive
epitome of the conditions controlling the legal regulation of
accountancy in the states of the union. Every accountant,
whether certified or not, must feel an interest in this vital matter,
and the conclusions reached by Mr. Glover, while they may not
meet with unanimous approval, will certainly attract attention
and conduce to effective thinking. The difficulties which are
inherent in political regulation of a profession were ably sum
marized by the speaker, and although some of us may feel a sense
of regret at the discouragement which he displayed with regard to
the possibility of restrictive legislation, all must admit the strength
of his arguments and be stimulated to greater endeavor for the
enlightenment of the public as to the true meaning of accountancy.
In the early days when the great aim was merely to have a law
written on the statute books the difficulties which have since
arisen were not foreseen. Then it was the opinion that when the
law providing for certification of accountants had been passed we
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should come into a kind of land of Beulah. Now having come
into a new land we find that Beulah is still ahead. It seems to be
inevitable that the course of accountancy legislation shall be
more than ordinarily disturbed by the political tactics of legisla
tors and lobbyists.
The paper by Henry B. Fernald, which
Accountants’ Certifi
also appeared in the October issue of
cates Discussed
this magazine, upon the general subject
of accountants’ certificates led to a discussion which occupied
practically an entire session. The subject is one in which every
accountant naturally is concerned, even if it does not fall to the
individual practitioner himself to sign a certificate. There are
many members of the Institute, probably, whose activities do not
involve the preparation of certified statements, but even such
members are intimately affected by the significance of the ac
countant’s certificate. If the public for whom the certificate really
is written can be brought to a full comprehension of the impor
tance which attaches to the accountant’s opinion every accountant
will be helped forward in his effort to occupy his proper position in
the professional world. Mr. Fernald’s paper was intended to be
and was provocative. Many of the questions which he presented
called forth immediate discussion, and there is no doubt that the
close attention paid to the discussion was merely a reflection of the
enthusiastic interest of the listeners.
As was expected, the meeting had
frequent reminders of the fact that the
first decade of the Institute’s life had
ended. The progress of the profession throughout the country
has been remarkable during the ten years since the American
Association of Public Accountants was reorganized and took the
form of the Institute, and there was a natural feeling of satis
faction in the evidence of growth and progress which the com
parative figures revealed. The meeting resolved that the secre
tary’s report, covering the decennial period, should be published
in The Journal of Accountancy and should be given other
general distribution as well. The report will be found on another
page of this issue. Some of the most remarkable figures which the
ten-year summary contains relate to the library and bureau of
information. It seems doubtful if the rate of development which
this department of the Institute’s work has maintained can be
365
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paralleled in any other library. The ratio of increase year by
year since the library was founded is altogether noteworthy.

It was the will of the meeting, unani
mously expressed, that next year the
Institute should meet on the Pacific
coast, and after consideration of the invitation extended by the
members from California it was resolved that Del Monte should
be the place. Those to whom the beautiful country about
Monterey is known will not need to be invited to attend a meeting
there. There is no more attractive part of the always delightful
California coast than that which the Institute has selected.
The hospitality of Californians is nationally known. It will be
twelve years next fall since the national organization held a meet
ing west of the Rocky mountains. There is to be a meeting of the
Dominion Association of Chartered Accountants in one of the
western provinces at a time shortly before or shortly after the
Institute’s meeting and those who attend one meeting can easily
attend both. The members in California are already bestirring
themselves to arouse interest in the meeting of 1927. For these
and many other reasons it is expected that when the Institute
assembles in September next year there will be a large attendance
from all parts of the country and that the year which will mark the
fortieth anniversary of the founding of the original American As
sociation of Public Accountants will be celebrated in a way com
mensurate with the importance of the occasion. Californians in
the Institute are suggesting that we should draw attention thus
early to the selection of Del Monte as a place of meeting, and it is
a pleasure to comply with this request.

To Meet in
California

One of the changes which will probably
take place in the education and experi
ence of the public accountant of tomor
row will be a trend toward the economic view of financial and
industrial questions. Heretofore the accountant has been rather
inclined to be an accountant and nothing more. By this we
mean that he has devoted himself almost exclusively either to
what might be called the pure or to the applied science of accounts.
He has been inclined to look first toward the accounts and second
arily, or perhaps not at all, toward the great underlying causes of
condition. In other words, he has reasoned deductively from ap
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parent facts. In the coming day he will probably change the
method of approach at times and follow the more philosophical
process of induction. To do that it will be necessary for him to
increase his grasp of the economic and social theories. He will be
required to be a student of history—and by that we do not mean
the text-books which relate the glories of any one race or nation.
Already there are evidences of an occasional excursion in the field
of political economy, but there has been no widespread migration
or even effective inroad into the broader country. There are
those who say that a man can not be expected to have a fair
comprehension of statistics unless he knows the reasons for the
things enumerated. Some folk go so far as to say that one must
be a careful student of sociology and many other things as well.
But for the most part these are academic counsels of perfection
which we have not the slightest intention of putting into practice.

All this is induced by a speech recently
reported in which there is so striking an
example of the force of economic think
ing when applied to financial problems that one is led to wonder
why we have not more economists among our accountants. The
speaker was Sir Josiah Stamp, chairman of the section of economic
science and statistics of the British Association. His subject
was the theory of inheritance in its relation to the distribution of
wealth; and, after a thoughtfully developed process of reasoning,
the speaker arrived at certain conclusions which, although he
declared them to be purely provisional, are nevertheless of such
significance that every student of affairs will feel an interest in
them. It is, of course, impossible to reproduce the entire speech
which this eminent economist delivered, but the conclusions are
brief and they do in effect summarize the entire utterance.
There was a time when the question of inheritance was less con
siderable in this country than it is today. Now we have come into
a time of great wealth which in the very nature of things must be
passed on from generation to generation, and therefore the coun
try is faced by a problem that must be answered. Here are the
conclusions which the speaker reached:

Inheritance and
Wealth

“ 1. In the past century unprecedented economic advance has been due
in the main to the greater use of invention and fixed capital. This has, in
turn, made new accumulation of savings possible, and has been made
possible by the growing fund of accumulation. In this accumulation the
principle of inheritance or bequest has played an important part. Where
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there has been freedom from the shackles of a family diffusion system the
greater progress has been possible. The individual motives which are
operative under such a system are stronger than ever, but operate over a
diminishing part of the field; they are also stronger over a short period, and
of diminishing effect over a long period of time. In other words, com
munal saving via company reserves (not subjected to the individual voli
tion for saving against spending) and via repayment of debt through funds
derived from taxation, and via large capital efforts (housing, &c.) partly
financed through taxation, is an increasing proportion of the total.
Although some of the values set up by such collective sums may figure in
individual estate values, they are not created or destroyed by interference
with or promotion of the right of inheritance.
“2. The remaining considerable section of capital accumulation is still
powerfully affected by inheritance rights, and would be more affected than
heretofore by interference with rights in the direct line, though less
affected than hitherto by rights out of that line. More considerable
changes might be made in the width of the rights than hitherto without
seriously affecting accumulation. On the other hand, the time element is
changing—accumulation is just as sensitive in the immediate provision and
immediate rights of family enjoyment but less sensitive to change (by
restriction or encouragement) in the most remote rights.
“3. The sense of ‘social injustice’ is directed against inequality of
wealth, of which inequality through inheritance is not now the larger part.
This sense, if limited to inheritance features, has less economic reaction
than is generally supposed. In any case, it is a sense which is not scien
tifically based. I think it probable that, through the inequalities due to
the system in which inheritance has a part, the average man has a slightly
smaller proportionate share of the aggregate than he would have had if
there had been no inheritance system, but a substantially larger absolute
amount, because he shares a larger aggregate or better standard of life
than he would have had under a system with no such aid to accumulation.
Whether in these circumstances he is justified in having a sense of injustice,
whether it is better for human welfare to have a low standard without
envy, or a higher one with envy, is a matter lying beyond economics in the
sphere of social psychology and philosophy.
“4. The particular claims for unlimited rights of bequest, as settling the
best economic direction and control, are gradually losing their force.
“5. The principles upon which death duty taxation is at present based,
though they may be the best available when administrative aspects are
included, might be improved upon by closer regard to the foregoing
analysis. The actual sum now being raised is not necessarily more harmful
economically than a similar sum raised by additional income tax, but it is
more repressive in accumulation than the same sum would be if a less sum
were raised at lower rates on the first succession and the balance were
raised at higher rates on succeeding successions.”

The calm consideration in this manner of a subject too often
regarded as a football in taxation and as a bombshell in radical
politics most assuredly has for accountants a value that is not
merely intellectual.
The report of the committee appointed
by the British parliament to make rec
ommendations for amendments in the
companies’ acts of the United Kingdom has been forwarded to the
president of the board of trade and by him to the parliament. The
companies’ acts of Great Britain constitute the legislation under

British Companies*
Acts Amendments
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which all corporate activity is conducted in that country, and it
has been the policy of parliament from time to time to ask for
suggestions for the betterment of the acts so that the commerce of
the kingdom might be assisted in every possible way. The British
have ever been desirous of furthering the development of their
trade, and in consideration of such legislation as the companies’
acts there has been rather less of what we should call politics and
rather more statesmanship than in many other classes of legisla
tive enactment. The committee which has been considering the
question during the past year included one chartered accountant
and one incorporated accountant, the former William Cash and
the latter Sir James Martin. The committee has been at work for
many months and has conducted several hearings. The recom
mendations which are of interest to accountants on this side of the
Atlantic are chiefly those which relate to the election, duties and
responsibilities of auditors. On this subject the committee says:
“We are of opinion that in general the law as it stands with regard to the
powers and duties of auditors is satisfactory. It would be a mistake in
our view to attempt further to define these by statute having regard to the
multifarious circumstances which in practice arise. It appears to us far
better that the law should retain its elasticity in this respect than that an
attempt should be made to confine it within the bounds of a rigid formula.
Cases in which auditors fall below the level of their duty are few and far
between. On the other hand, we consider that the protection which the
ordinary ‘wilful default’ clause gives to auditors, as was decided in the
City Equitable case, is as unwarranted as it is in the case of directors, and
we recommend that it should be forbidden. As a corollary to this, we
consider that auditors should be entitled to relief under sect. 279 in the
same manner as directors.
“Certain of the alterations in the law which we have recommended on
the subject of accounts will strengthen the position of auditors by giving
statutory sanction to what is already the best professional practice.”

The extremely interesting judgment to
which this section of the report refers
was rendered on July 11, 1924, in the
The substance of the decision is expressed in the

Extent of
Responsibility
court of appeal.
following words:

“I then come to consider whether or not . . . the conduct of Mr.
Lepine was wilful so as to render him responsible, or is he relieved by the
terms of article 150? Now we find the auditor confronted with a lot of
deceit. We find him fulfilling year by year his duty in a manner which
has certainly received the praise of those who have given evidence about
it and of the learned judge who heard the whole of the facts. We find
that on a number of occasions he was successful in putting what was
wrong, or attempting to put what was wrong, right, and therefore you
find that so far as his will and volition went he was attempting to do
his duty. Under those circumstances where you find a default which has
been made, and you find an error of judgment in accepting as trustworthy
what is now proved to be untrustworthy can you say . . . that he has
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been guilty of wilful neglect or default? For my part, for the reasons
which I have indicated and upon the evidence to which I have called
attention it seems to me impossible so to characterize Mr. Lepine’s con
duct. He did not, to my mind, shut his eyes to conduct which ne thought
needed criticism; what he did was, in common with a great number of
other persons, he thought the people he was dealing with were trustworthy,
and, as pointed out in the cases cited to us, but which I do not stop to
actually quote, it has been pointed out again and again that he is entitled
to accept the statements which were made to him by those whom he was
entitled to trust when he has no reason, or call, for suspicion. It appears
to me that the learned judge has quite rightly and accurately applied the
law to the facts when he says this: ‘ If in certain matters he fell short of his
real duty, it was because, in all good faith, he held a mistaken belief as to
what that duty was,' and that the auditor conducted the audits honestly
and carefully. He made an error of judgment, an error of judgment which
might have caused the company, or the directors of the company, to take
a different course, and might have possibly saved some portion of the
disaster, but in what he did I cannot find that he was guilty of wilful mis
conduct, and therefore it appears to me section 150 protects him. In
those circumstances it appears to me that the learned judge was right in
the judgment that he has given, and that this appeal ought to be dis
missed, and dismissed with costs."

Section 279 to which reference is made above reads as follows:
"If in any proceeding against a director, or person occupying the
position of director, of a company for negligence or breach of trust it
appears to the court hearing the case that the director or person is or may
be liable in respect of the negligence or breach of trust, but has acted
honestly and reasonably, and ought fairly to be excused for the negligence
or breach of trust, that court may relieve him, either wholly or partly,
from his liability on such terms as the court may think proper.”

We come now to a recommendation by
the committee which seems to us the
most important in the whole report—at
least it is so from the point of view of the auditor. The report says:

To Protect the
Auditor

"The City Equitable case has also drawn attention to the question of the
duties of auditors in connection with the verification of securities belonging
to the company. It has been suggested to us that the certificate which an
auditor should be entitled to accept as to the existence and custody of the
company’s securities should be fixed by statute, e. g., the certificate of a
bank. The evidence does not in our opinion show that any such change in
the law is required. Circumstances may justify the acceptance of a cer
tificate in one case which a careful auditor would refuse to accept in
another, and we would prefer to see the matter left to the ordinary law of
negligence which is sufficiently elastic to meet all cases as they arise.
Our recommendation with regard to ‘wilful default’ clauses in articles
gives point to this argument.
“ We recommend that—
“(I) The provision mentioned in paragraph 47 above with regard to
directors’ liability for negligence or breach of duty should be extended to
auditors and sect. 279 should be amended so as to include auditors.
“(II) Except in the case of private companies, partners and employees
of directors or other officers of the company should be ineligible for ap
pointment as auditors.’’

Here is the crux of the whole matter. If the directors are to be
exonerated from responsibility for errors or omissions of which
they are unaware; if the so-called “wilful default’’ clause is to
370
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relieve them from substantial or moral obligation, it is certainly
only fair that a similar relief should be extended to the accountant
in cases where the neglect or default is conclusively proven to be
innocent of intent. Every accountant knows that the shrewd and
unscrupulous client may at times be able to mislead if not actually
to deceive. The accountant can do his best to exercise reasonable
care and diligence, and if he does that it is perfectly natural that
he should feel that he has done his duty. Attempts which have
been made in the British courts to place the responsibility for
error upon the accountant when the accountant has done all that
is required by established practice have invariably led to judg
ment for the defendant. If the introduction of the committee’s
recommendation in the English companies’ acts will make clear the
true measure of responsibility which rests upon any professional
man a great reform will have been accomplished. The account
ant should be responsible when he is wilfully negligent or grossly
careless, but only those who regard an accountant as infallible can
believe that perfection should be expected of him when it is not
expected of any other man. The recommendations of the parlia
mentary committee seem to us to say that the accountant must do
his professional duty and that he must be protected when he has
done it.

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS
TRIAL BOARD
At a regular meeting of the council of the American Institute of Accountants
at Washington, D. C., September 20,1926, the council, upon motion, adjourned
to convene as a trial board to hear charges of unprofessional conduct which had
been made against a member of the Institute. The charges were presented
by the Institute’s counsel. The defendant was present in person, accompanied
by counsel.
The charges involved certain allegations of fraud against another member of
the Institute which the defendant member had not been able to substantiate.
After presentation of the evidence and the defense the defendant and his counsel
were excused and the trial board went into executive session.
After discussion of the case it was resolved that the defendant be found
guilty as charged. It was also resolved that the defendant be advised of the
finding of the trial board and that the penalty imposed be a reprimand and
warning against further conduct of the same kind.
It was resolved that in publication of the report of this trial the name of
complainant and defendant be omitted.
The defendant was then recalled to the room and received the judgment and
admonition of the trial board.
The trial board adjourned and the council reconvened.
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Edited by Stephen G. Rusk
As has been pointed out in this department on several occasions, accountants
handling tax cases for their clients find it necessary at times to revolutionize
their ideas that two and two equal four. It is not difficult, upon absorbing
the entire subject of federal income and estate taxation, clearly to compre
hend the intent of the language of the law. Having equipped himself with
this lore, an accountant is sometimes prone to neglect to consult closely the
language of a given provision of the law. Placing one’s faith in a clear under
standing of the theory upon which the taxation is founded, one does not see
at once the loopholes provided in the language by which the intent is supposed
to be revealed.
If one realizes that congress intended to allow taxpayers a certain amount
of relief because of amortization of war facilities, and one should find that the
abnormal prices at which such facilities were acquired during the war period
were maintained until years after the close of the war, this one, if an accountant,
would probably conclude that no amortization was sustained on these facili
ties. A lawyer, however, would examine closely the language of the act; would
take account of the fact that for several months after the armistice was signed
the prices of these facilities were temporarily but materially lower than at the
date of their acquisition, and base his case accordingly. An eminent lawyer
once told the writer that, in his opinion, the amortization sections of the acts
of 1917 and 1918 were open to several constructions, not necessarily one that
would accord with accountancy theory.
A lawyer would take cognizance of every defect in the language supposed
to reveal the intent. He would then build his case, based on a theory which
in a minute degree, but effectively, seemed to show that congress had intended
something a bit different than that which was commonly accepted. How
many cases have we seen successfully brought to issue on some such apparently
trivial defect!
This is not written with the thought that all accountants are not alert to
this view of the law, for we have heard that the almost successful attempt to
upset the commissioner’s theory that income tax is a liability for the year in
which the things occur upon which the tax is predicated was initiated by a
certified public accountant (a woman, we have heard). Once the question
was raised, we all saw the force of the arguments underlying her interpreta
tion, and we realized how vulnerable was the commissioner’s position, but
as his theory was so eminently in accord with our accountancy theory and
practice, we realized that we had failed to note that the law itself was subject
to more than one interpretation.
How many of us accountants would have thought that the method pre
scribed by the commissioner for computing excess-profits graduated taxes
would be subjected to question? His method seemed so logical and clear and
so in accordance with our own method of making such calculations that we
did not carefully scan the language of the original act to see whether or not
this method was that which congress intended. As it turned out, this theory
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and method prevailed, but only after several astute lawyers directed the at
tention of the courts (in litigation on the subject) to the fact that the com
missioner’s method was not strictly in accordance with the language of the act.
It behooves us always to examine the law carefully—painstakingly; to
ponder well as to whether the accepted interpretation is the correct one. Too
much reliance must not be put upon the commissioner’s interpretations, nor
must one rely on one’s own preconceived notions as to what is meant by that
which is written into the law.

SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
Where a partnership composed of former stockholders of a corporation re
ceived the surplus of the corporation on its liquidation in 1919 under an agree
ment that the surplus should be continued in use by the partnership without
any distribution thereof whatever until the firm should be dissolved, the trans
action was a distribution of assets, and the surplus so distributed was taxable
income for the year 1919, and if the regulations are to be construed as exempt
ing such surplus from taxation, they are void to that extent.
There is a distinction between a dividend as generally understood and a
distribution in liquidation, and a surplus assignable to a stockholder in
circumstances set forth in preceding paragraph was such a distribution, and
the profit realized on the transaction was taxable. (Circuit court of appeals,
sixth circuit, George Langstaff v. Robert H. Lucas, collector.)
Where the only fact averment was the amount of the estate tax returned,
the amount found by the commissioner and the amount determined on appeal
to the board of tax appeals, the taxpayer’s demurrer for failure to state a cause
of action was sustained, as the commissioner’s finding does not constitute a
prima facie case after the board has reached a different result. (United States
district court of Pennsylvania, United States v. Rodenbough, executor.)
Interest paid by a corporation in 1918, accrued for ten years prior, is de
ductible though never charged on the books before 1918. (United States
district court, W. D. of eastern district of Arkansas, Jungkind Photo Supply Co.
v. H. L. Remmel, collector.)
Income from personal property received by executor, beneficially belong
ing to exempt corporations, was not taxable under 1918 act. (United States
district court, S. D. of New York, Executors of estate of Margaret Olivia Sage v.
Bowers, collector.)

Corporation keeping books on an accrual basis (clearly reflecting income),
and having made return on such basis, may not change to cash basis for 1917
part of fiscal year ending in 1918. (United States district court, S. D. of New
York, W. S. Barstow & Co., Inc., v. Bowers, collector.)
Mechanics’ liens have priority over federal income taxes assessed subsequent
to the filing of the liens. (United States district court, N. D. of New York,
In re Caswell Construction Co., Inc.)

TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3872, May 21, 1926)

Article 681: Reserve funds
Income Tax—Act of 1913—Decision of Supreme Court
1. Income—Deduction—Insurance company—Dividend—Premium
Overpayments of premiums by preferred dividend policyholders
in 1912, which were ascertained in 1913 and added to the amount
held for future distribution, are not deductible from income for the
year 1913 under section II G (b) of the act of 1913 as an amount paid
back or credited to an individual policyholder within the year.
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2. Deduction—Loss—A mortization—Securities—Bonds
Additions to a fund for the purpose of amortizing bonds purchased
at a premium are not deductible as a loss sustained within the year
under the provisions of section II G (b) of the act of 1913, since no
loss is ascertainable until the bonds are sold or paid off.

3. Deduction—Reserve funds
The estimated value on December 31, 1913, of future premiums,
which were waived on policies after proof of total or permanent dis
ability, is not deductible as a net addition to a reserve required by
law, although required by the state superintendent of insurance to
be reported and carried as a liability.
4. Same—Unreported losses
A special fund required by the state superintendent of insurance to
meet unreported losses of policyholders who died during the calendar
year, but whose deaths were not reported before the end of the year,
is not deductible as a net addition to a reserve required by law, as the
item was not reserved from premiums to meet policy obligations at
maturity, although it represented a liability.
5. Same—Annuities
Additions to a fund set aside to provide for payment of annuities
to former soliciting agents of the company are not deductible as a net
addition to a reserve required by law, as compensation of soliciting
agents has no relation to the reserve held to meet maturing policies.

The following decision of the United States supreme court in the case of

New York Life Insurance Co. v. Edwards, collector, is published for the in

formation of internal-revenue officers and others concerned.

Supreme Court

of the

United States

712. New York Life Insurance Co., petitioner, v. William H. Edwards, as
collector of internal revenue, etc.

804. William H. Edwards, as collector of internal revenue for the second district
of New York, petitioner, v. New York Life Insurance Co.
[April 19, 1926.]
On writs of certiorari to the United States circuit court of appeals for the
second circuit.
Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court.

The insurance company brought suit in the district court at New York to
recover of Edwards, collector, the alleged excessive sum demanded of it as
income tax for the year 1913 and obtained judgment for a part. (3 Fed. (2d),
280.) The circuit court of appeals affirmed this except as to one item. (8 Fed.
(2d), 851.) Both parties are here by certiorari, and five questions require
consideration. All involve the construction or application of the revenue act
of October 3, 1913 (ch. 16, 38 Stat., 114, 172). Section II G (a) imposed an
annual tax of 1 per centum upon the net income of “every insurance company
organized in the United States,” and (b) directed:
“Such net income shall be ascertained by deducting from the gross amount
of the income of such . . . insurance company, received within the year
from all sources, (first) all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid within
the year in the maintenance and operation of its business and properties, in
cluding rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the
continued use or possession of property; (second) all losses actually sustained
within the year and not compensated by insurance or otherwise, including
a reasonable allowance for depreciation by use, wear and tear of property, if
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any; . . . and in case of insurance companies the net addition, if any, re
quired by law to be made within the year to reserve funds and the sums other
than dividends paid within the year on policy and annuity contracts: Provided,
That . . . life insurance companies shall not include as income in any year
such portion of any actual premium received from any individual policyholder
as shall have been paid back or credited to such individual policyholder, or
treated as an abatement of premium of such individual policyholder, within
such year ...”
1. The company, a New York corporation without capital stock, does busi
ness on the mutual, level premium plan, and issues both “annual dividend”
and “deferred dividend” policies. Under this plan each policyholder pays
annually in advance a fixed sum which, when added to like payments by others,
probably will create a fund larger than necessary to meet all maturing policies
and estimated expenses. At the end of each year the actual insurance costs
and expenses incurred are ascertained. The difference between their sum
and the total of advance payments and other income then becomes the “over
payment” or surplus fund for immediate pro rata distribution among policy
holders as dividends or for such future disposition as the contracts provide.
An “annual dividend” policyholder receives his proportionate part of this
fund each year in cash or as a credit upon or abatement of his next premium.
“Deferred dividend” or, as sometimes called “distribution” policies provide:
“That no dividend or surplus shall be allowed or paid upon this policy,
unless the insured shall survive until completion of its distribution period, and
unless this policy shall then be in force. That surplus or profits derived from
such policies on the distribution policy plan as shall not be in force at the date
of the completion of their respective distribution periods shall be apportioned
among such policies as shall complete the distribution periods.”
. Accordingly, all overpayments by deferred dividend policyholders must
await apportionment until the prescribed period ends; and no one of them will
receive anything therefrom if his policy lapses or if he dies before that time.
The whole of this fund goes to the survivors.
Overpayments by deferred dividend policyholders for 1912 amounted to
$8,189,918. The collector refused to deduct this sum from the total receipts,
and demanded the prescribed tax of 1 per centum thereon. We think he acted
properly. Both courts below so held.
The applicable doctrine was much considered in Penn Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Lederer (252 U. S., 523 [T. D. 3046, C B 3, 249]). We there pointed out
the probable reason for the permitted noninclusion in the net income of a life
insurance company of “such portion of any actual premium received from any
individual policyholder as shall have been paid back or credited to such indi
vidual policyholder, or treated as an abatement of premium of such individual
policyholder, within such year.” Here it is insisted that within the meaning
of the quoted provision each deferred dividend policyholder’s overpayment
was actually credited to him during the year; but we can not accept this theory.
The aggregate of all such payments was held for distribution among policyholders alive at the end of the period. The receipts for the year were not really
diminished.
2. The company owned many bonds, etc., payable at future dates, purchased
at prices above their par values, and to amortize these premiums a fund was
set up. It claimed that an addition to this fund should be deducted from gross
receipts. The district court thought the claim well founded, but the circuit
court of appeals took another view. Unless the addition amounted to a loss
“actually sustained during the year” no deduction could be made therefor.
Obviously, no actual ascertainable loss had occurred. All of the securities
might have been sold thereafter above cost. The result of the venture could
not be known until they were either sold or paid off.
3. In 1910 the company introduced a clause into some policies by which it
agreed to waive payment of premiums after proof of total and permanent
disability. The estimated value on December 31, 1913, of future premiums
so waived amounted to $16,629. It claimed this should be added to the reserve
fund and deducted from gross income. Insurance companies may deduct “the
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net addition, if any, required by law to be made within the year to reserve
funds.”
The pertinent portion of the agreed statement of facts follows:
In 1910 the plaintiff introduced into some of its contracts of life insurance a
clause under which it agreed that upon receipt, before default in the payment
of premium, of due proof that the insured had become totally and permanently
disabled, the plaintiff would waive payment of any premium thereafter falling
due. In taking its account at the end of the calendar year 1913, the plaintiff
had then received due proof that the insured under a number of these policies
were totally and permanently disabled in accordance with the terms of said
contracts providing for the waiver of the payment of future premiums. The
value at December 31, 1913, of the future premiums waived on account of
total and permanent disability was the sum of $16,629. The value at Decem
ber 31, 1912, of the future premiums so waived was the sum of $5,637.
In the calculation of the general reserve fund at the end of any calendar
year, the company and the insurance department of the state of New York
make the computation by deducting from the value of the contractual benefits
under each policy the then value of all future premiums under the policy.
The general reserve fund of the plaintiff stated in its annual statement is thus
the reserve computed by deducting the value of all future premiums from the
valuation of all policy obligations. But, under the policies on the lives of
those who had become totally and permanently disabled and whose contracts
provided for the waiver of the payment of future premiums, no future pre
miums will be received by the plaintiff and, therefore, the net reserve reported
for these policies is understated to the extent of the value of these future pre
miums.
In the official blank for the plaintiff’s annual statement to be used at Decem
ber 31, 1913, there was an item of liabilities, No. 9-a, entitled, “Present value
of future premiums waived on account of total and permanent disability,”
and in the plaintiff’s annual statement the sum reported under this item was
$16,629 at December 31, 1913. The sum of $16,629 reported under item
No. 9-a was not included in the plaintiff’s general reserve. In the official
blank for use at December 31, 1912, there was no such item as No. 9-a, and
the plaintiff included the value at December 31, 1912, of future premiums
waived on account of total and permanent disability (viz, $5,637) as a part
of the general reserve at that date.
If said sum of $5,637 had not been included as a part of the general reserve
at December 31, 1912, the net addition to the value of future premiums waived
on account of total and permanent disability would have been the excess of
$16,629 over $5,637. Since, however, owing to the change in the form of the
official blank, the said $5,637 was deducted as a part of the plaintiff’s general
reserve in obtaining the net addition to the general reserve, the sum to use
in obtaining the net addition to the value of future premiums waived on ac
count of total and permanent disability in the sum of $16,629.
The circuit court of appeals held the deduction should have been allowed,
but we think otherwise.
The superintendent of insurance of New York required this item to be re
ported as a liability and did not treat it as part of the general reserve. Upon
the agreed facts we can not say that it was part of any reserve required by
the laws of New York. There is nothing to show how “the value of the con
tractual benefits" under these policies was arrived at, and, considering the
evidence presented, we must accept the superintendent’s conclusion. The
company has not shown enough to establish its right to the exemption.
4. A number of policyholders died during the calendar year, but their deaths
were not reported before it terminated. The superintendent of insurance re
quired the company to set aside a special fund to meet these unreported losses,
and it claimed that this was an addition to the reserve fund required by law.
We think this claim was properly rejected by the commissioner, although the
courts below held otherwise. McCoach v. Insurance Co. of North America
(244 U. S., 585) and United States v. Boston Insurance Co. (U. S.), (Novem
ber 23, 1925 [T. D. 3792, bulletin V-1, 24]) pointed out that “the net addi
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tion, if any, required by law to be made within the year to reserve funds”
does not necessarily include whatever a state official may so designate; that
“reserve funds” has a technical meaning. It is unnecessary now to amplify
what was there said. The item under consideration represented a liability
and not something reserved from premiums to meet policy obligations at
maturity.
5. The company also claimed deduction for additions to a fund set aside
to provide for payment of annuities to former soliciting agents as provided
by their contracts of employment. The commissioner properly rejected this
item, although both courts below held a different view. The agreed statement
of facts shows:
The plaintiff has a form of contract of employment with many of its solic
iting agents under which, if such agents for a period of 20 years continuously
devote their entire time, talents, and energies in soliciting applications for
insurance, and if they shall for the 20 years accomplish certain prescribed
minimum results, then at the end of 20 years of such service each such agent
becomes entitled to an income for life payable monthly, the amount of the
payment being based upon the results obtained by each such agent during the
20-year period. The laws of New York require the superintendent of insur
ance, in making a valuation of the obligations of the plaintiff, to value annuities
on the standard of McClintock’s “Table of mortality among annuitants,”
with interest not exceeding 4 per centum per annum. Said superintendent
of insurance, after making an examination of the plaintiff and valuing its
liabilities, required the plaintiff to carry, and it does carry, a fund to meet its
said liabilities on said contracts with its soliciting agents; and this fund it
increased during the year 1913. The net addition to said fund for said year
was the sum of $160,641, which the plaintiff, in making its said return, de
ducted from gross income under that clause of the law which authorizes a life
insurance corporation to deduct the net addition required by law to be made
within the year to reserve funds. But in amending said return the com
missioner refused to allow said deduction, and thereby made the plaintiff’s
net income for the year appear to be $160,641 more than it would have been if
said deduction had been allowed, and he assessed and collected an additional
tax on account thereof accordingly in the sum of $1,606.41, which forms a part
of the tax in controversy in this suit.
As pointed out above, the term “reserve funds,” in the taxing act, has a
technical meaning. The compensation which an insurance company agrees
to pay soliciting agents has no relation to the reserve held to meet maturing
policies; and when it sets aside a fund to provide payments to such agents
this can not be regarded as a reserve within intendment of the statute.
The judgment below must be reversed. The cause will be remanded to the
district court for further proceedings in harmony with this opinion.

(T. D. 3921, August 27, 1926)

Article 42: Sale of personal property on instalment plan.
Income Tax
Sales of personal and real property on instalment plan and de
ferred-payment sales of real property not on instalment plan.
Sections 212 (d), 232, and 1208 of the revenue act of 1926, pertaining to sales
of personal and real property, provide as follows:
Sec. 212. (d) Under regulations prescribed by the commissioner with the
approval of the secretary, a person who regularly sells or otherwise disposes
of personal property on the instalment plan may return as income therefrom
in any taxable year that proportion of the instalment payments actually re
ceived in that year which the total profit realized or to be realized when the
payment is completed, bears to the total contract price. In the case (1) of a
casual sale or other casual disposition of personal property for a price exceed
ing $1,000, or (2) of a sale or other disposition of real property, if in either case
the initial payments do not exceed one-fourth of the purchase price, the income
may, under regulations prescribed by the commissioner with the approval of
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the secretary, be returned on the basis and in the manner above prescribed
in this subdivision. As used in this subdivision the term “initial payments”
means the payments received in cash or property other than evidences of
indebtedness of the purchaser during the taxable period in which the sale or
other disposition is made.
Sec. 232. In the case of a corporation subject to the tax imposed by section
230 the term “net income” means the gross income as defined in section 233
less the deductions allowed by sections 234 and 206, and the net income shall
be computed on the same basis as is provided in subdivisions (b) and (d) of
section 212 or in section 226. In the case of a foreign corporation or of a cor
poration entitled to the benefits of section 262 the computation shall also be
made in the manner provided in section 217.
Sec. 1208. The provisions of subdivision (d) of section 212 shall be retro
actively applied in computing income under the provisions of the revenue
act of 1916, the revenue act of 1917, the revenue act of 1918, the revenue act
of 1921, or the revenue act of 1924, or any of such acts as amended. Any tax
that has been paid under such acts prior to the enactment of this act, if in
excess of the tax imposed by such acts as retroactively modified by this section,
shall, subject to the statutory period of limitations properly applicable thereto,
be credited or refunded to the taxpayer as provided in section 284.
SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY ON INSTALMENT PLAN

Dealers in personal property ordinarily sell either for cash or on the personal
credit of the purchaser or on the instalment plan. Dealers who sell on the
instalment plan usually adopt one of four ways of protecting themselves in case
of default:
(a) By an agreement that title is to remain in the vendor until the pur
chaser has completely performed his part of the transaction;
(b) By a form of contract in which title is conveyed to the purchaser im
mediately, but subject to a lien for the unpaid portion of the purchase price;
(c) By a present transfer of title to the purchaser, who at the same time exe
cutes a reconveyance in the form of a chattel mortgage to the vendor; or
(d) By conveyance to a trustee pending performance of the contract and
subject to its provisions.
The general purpose and effect being the same in all of these cases, the same
rule is uniformly applicable. The rule prescribed is that a person who regu
larly sells or otherwise disposes of personal property on the instalment plan,
whether or not title remains in the vendor until the property is fully paid for,
may return as income therefrom in any taxable year that proportion of the
instalment payments actually received in that year which the total or gross
profit (that is, sales less cost of goods sold) realized or to be realized when the
property is paid for bears to the total contract price. Thus the income of a
dealer in personal property on the instalment plan may be ascertained by
taking as income that proportion of the total payments received in the taxable
year from instalment sales (such payments being allocated to the year against
the sales of which they apply) which the total or gross profit realized or to be
realized on the total instalment sales made during each year bears to the total
contract price of all such sales made during that respective year. No pay
ments received in the taxable year shall be excluded in computing the amount
of income to be returned on the ground that they were received under a sale the
total profit from which was returned as income during a taxable year or years
prior to the change by the taxpayer to the instalment basis of returning income.
Deductible items are not to be allocated to the years in which the profits from
the sales of a particular year are to be returned as income, but must be deducted
for the taxable year in which the items are paid or incurred, or paid or accrued,
as provided by section 200 (d) of the revenue act of 1926.
In the case of a casual sale or other casual disposition of personal property
for a price exceeding $1,000, income may be returned on the instalment basis
provided the payments received in cash or property other than evidences of
indebtedness of the purchaser during the taxable year in which the sale or other
disposition is made do not exceed one-fourth of the purchase price.
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If for any reason the purchaser defaults in any of his payments, and the
vendor returning income on the instalment basis repossesses the property, the
entire amount received on instalment payments and retained by the vendor,
less the profits previously returned as income, will be income of the vendor for
the year in which the property is repossessed, and the property repossessed
must be included in the inventory of the vendor at its original cost, less proper
allowance for damage and use, if any.
If the vendor chooses as a matter of consistent practice to return the income
from instalment sales on the straight accrual or cash receipts and disburse
ments basis, such a course is permissible.
The foregoing provisions shall be retroactively applied in computing income
from the sale of personal property under the revenue acts of 1916, 1917, 1918,
1921 and 1924, or any such acts as amended. Any dealer in personal property
on the instalment plan whose books of account contain adequate information
and were kept so that income can be accurately computed on the instalment
basis may file amended returns accordingly, and the excess of the amount of
any tax previously paid over the tax as computed on the instalment basis as
herein provided shall, subject to the statutory period of limitations properly
applicable thereto, be credited or refunded.
SALE OF PROPERTY IN LOTS

Where a tract of land is purchased with a view to dividing it into lots or
parcels of ground to be sold as such, the cost or other basis shall be equitably
apportioned to the several lots or parcels and made a matter of record on the
books of the taxpayer, to the end that any gain derived from the sale of any
such lots or parcels which constitutes taxable income may be returned as
income for the year in which the sale is made. This rule contemplates that
there will be a measure of gain or loss on every lot or parcel sold, and not
that the capital in the entire tract shall be extinguished before any taxable
income shall be returned. The sale of each lot or parcel will be treated as a
separate transaction, and gain or loss computed accordingly.
SALE OF REAL PROPERTY INVOLVING DEFERRED PAYMENTS

Under section 212 (d) of the revenue act of 1926 deferred-payment sales of
real property fall into two classes when considered with respect to the terms of
sale, as follows:
(1) Sales of property on the instalment plan; that is, sales in which the
payments received in cash or property other than evidences of indebtedness of
the purchaser during the taxable year in which the sale is made do not exceed
one-fourth of the purchase price.
(2) Deferred-payment sales not on the instalment plan; that is, sales in
which the payments received in cash or property other than evidences of
indebtedness of the purchaser during the taxable year in which the sale is made
exceed one-fourth of the purchase price.
Sales falling within class (1) and class (2) alike include (a) agreements of
purchase and sale which contemplate that a conveyance is not to be made at
the outset, but only after all or a substantial portion of the purchase price has
been paid, and (b) sales where there is an immediate transfer of title, the
vendor being protected by a mortgage or other lien as to deferred payments.
In the sale of mortgaged property, the amount of the mortgage, whether the
property is merely taken subject to the mortgage or whether the mortgage is
assumed by the purchaser, shall not be considered as a part of the ‘‘initial
payments” or of the “total contract price,” but shall be included as part of the
“purchase price,” as those terms are used in section 212 (d) of the revenue act
of 1926 and in this treasury decision. Commissions and other selling expenses
paid or incurred by the vendor are not to be deducted or taken into account in
determining the amount of the “initial payments,” the “total contract price,”
or the “purchase price.”
SALE OF REAL PROPERTY ON INSTALMENT PLAN

In transactions included in the first class of deferred-payment sales the
vendor may return as income from such transactions in any taxable year that
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proportion of the instalment payments actually received in that year which the
total profit realized or to be realized when the property is paid for bears to the
total contract price.
If for any reason the purchaser defaults in any of his payments, and the
vendor returning income on the instalment basis repossesses the property, the
entire amount received on instalment payments and retained by the vendor,
less the sum of the profits previously returned as income and an amount
representing proper adjustment for exhaustion, wear and tear, obsolescence,
amortization, and depletion of the property while in the hands of the purchaser,
will be income of the vendor for the year in which the property is repossessed,
and the basis of the property in the hands of the vendor will be the original
basis at the time of the instalment sale.
If the vendor chooses as a matter of consistent practice to return the income
from instalments sales on the straight accrual or cash receipts and disburse
ments basis, such a course is permissible, and the sales will be treated as de
ferred-payment sales not on the instalment plan.
DEFERRED-PAYMENT SALES OF REAL PROPERTY NOT ON INSTALMENT PLAN

In the second class of deferred-payment sales the obligations of the pur
chaser received by the vendor are to be considered as the equivalent of cash to
the amount of their fair market value in ascertaining the profit or loss from the
transaction.
If the vendor had retained title to the property and the purchaser defaults in
any of his payments, and the vendor repossesses the same by agreement or
process of law, the difference between (1) the entire amount of the payments
actually received on the contract and retained by the vendor and (2) the sum of
the profits previously returned as income in connection therewith and an
amount representing proper adjustment for exhaustion, wear and tear, obso
lescence, amortization, and depletion of the property while in the hands of the
purchaser will constitute gain or loss, as the case may be, to the vendor for the
year in which the property is repossessed, and the basis of the property in
the hands of the vendor will be the original basis at the time of the sale. If
the vendor had previously transferred title to the purchaser and the purchaser
defaults in any of his payments and the vendor reacquires the property, such
repossession shall be regarded as a transfer by the vendor, in exchange for the
property, of so much of the face value of the purchaser’s obligations as are
applied by the vendor to the purchase or bid price of the property. Such an
exchange will be regarded as having resulted in the realization by the vendor of
gain or loss, as the case may be, for the year of repossession, measured by the
difference between the fair market value of the property and the face value of
those obligations of the purchaser which were applied by the vendor to the
purchase or bid price of the property to the extent that the fair market value
thereof was previously recognized in computing income. The fair market
value of the property shall be presumed to be the amount for which it is bid in
by the vendor in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary. If
the property so acquired is subsequently sold, the basis for determining gain or
loss is the fair market value of the property at the date of acquisition.
If the obligations received by the vendor have no fair market value, the
payments in cash or other property having a fair market value shall be applied
against and reduce the basis of the property sold, and, if in excess of such basis,
shall be taxable to the extent of the excess. Gain or loss is realized when the
obligations are disposed of or satisfied, the amount being the difference between
the reduced basis as provided above and the amount realized therefor.
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION

The provisions of this treasury decision shall be retroactively applied in
computing income under the revenue acts of 1916, 1917, 1918, 1921 and 1924,
or any of such acts as amended, in accordance with section 1298 of the revenue
act of 1926.
All rulings inconsistent herewith are hereby revoked.
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(T. D. 3920, August 27, 1926)

Article 1351: Suits for recovery of taxes erroneously collected
(Also section 231, article 517)

Income Taxes—Revenue Act of 1924—Decision of Court
1. Injunction—Exempt institutions—Section 3224, R. S.
Under section 3224, R. S., injunction will not issue to restrain
the assessment and collection of taxes from a voluntary religious
association, although it is exempt from taxes under section 231 of
the revenue act of 1924.
2. Actions—Claim for refund—Section 3226, R. S.
Under section 3226, R. S., no action for the recovery back of
taxes paid can be maintained unless after the payment of the tax a
claim for refund has been filed.
3. Decisions followed.
The decisions of the supreme court in the cases of Dodge v.
Osborn (240 U. S., 118, T. D. 2301), Graham v. Du Pont (262 U. S.,
234, T. D. 3486 [C. B. II-1, 226]), Bailey v. George (259 U. S., 16,
T. D. 3347 [C. B. I-2, 242]), and Rock Island Railroad v. U. S.
(254 U. S., 141) followed.
The following decision of the district court of the United States for the
western district of Michigan, in the case of Israelite House of David v. Holden,
collector, is published for the information of internal-revenue officers and others
concerned.
United States District Court, Western District of Michigan
Israelite House of David v. Holden, collector

[June 16, 1926.]

Raymond, D. F.: The bill of complaint filed by plaintiff alleges that it is an

unincorporated voluntary religious association organized according to the
apostolic plan; that it has one common treasury or community fund; that it is
operated exclusively for religious and charitable purposes; and that by the
provisions of section 231 of the revenue act of 1924 it is expressly exempted
from taxation.
It is alleged that defendant, in disregard of plaintiff's right of exemption,
levied and collected from plaintiff a tax for the year 1924 in the sum of $947.06,
with interest, and it appears from the bill of complaint and admissions made at
the hearing that a penalty was also collected. It is also set forth that plaintiff
has protested to the commissioner of internal revenue and that its claimed
right of exemption has been denied by said commissioner. Plaintiff prays that
defendant be enjoined from imposing upon or collecting any tax from plaintiff
under the revenue act of 1924 and that plaintiff have judgment against defend
ant for the taxes, interest and penalty unlawfully exacted.
The matter is before the court upon motion to dismiss filed by defendant.
The substantial grounds of the motion are that plaintiff has an adequate
remedy at law, that the bill of complaint does not set forth any ground for
injunctive or other relief in a court of equity, and that the suit is brought for
the purposes of restraining the assessment and collection of taxes, contrary to
statutory provisions.
It seems clear that the bill of complaint states no cause of action of which
a court of equity can take jurisdiction. Section 3224 of the Revised Statutes
is as follows:
“ No suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any
tax shall be maintained in any court.”
Counsel insists that this court of equity should determine the status of
plaintiff as it relates to the exemption provided by section 231. No case has
been cited or discovered which authorizes such a determination. The case of
Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden (263 U. S., 578), cited by plaintiff, was an action
at law. In the case of Kensett v. Stivers (10 Fed., 517), it was held that the
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collection of a tax can not be restrained by injunction in any court of equity
in the United States, however erroneously or illegally it may have been assessed,
if assessed by the proper officer. See also Dodge v. Osborn (240 U. S., 118) and
Graham v. Du Pont (362 U. S., 234). In the case of Bailey v. George (259 U. S.,
16), it was held by Chief Justice Taft that a bill to enjoin a levy and sale of
property to satisfy a penalty prescribed as a tax would not lie when it sets up
no extraordinary circumstances rendering section 3224 inapplicable and
exhibits no reason why the legal remedy of payment under protest and action
to recover would not be adequate. No reason is set forth in the bill in this case
why the legal remedy is not adequate, and it follows that relief in equity must
be denied.
The plaintiff prays for judgment against defendant for the taxes, interest
and penalty thereon claimed to have been illegally exacted from it. So far
as the relief thus prayed is concerned the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at
law. Equity rule 22 provides that if at any time it appears that a suit com
menced in equity should have been brought on the law side of the court it shall
forthwith be transferred to the law side and there proceeded with, with only
such alterations in the pleadings as shall be essential.
It is urged by counsel for defendant that the bill of complaint does not set
forth compliance with section 3226 of the Revised Statutes, in that it does not
appear that appeal has been duly made to the commissioner of internal revenue
and his decision had upon such appeal as a condition precedent to the main
tenance of suit.
Counsel for plaintiff relies upon the cases of Weaver v. Ewers (195 Fed.,
247), Loomis v. Wattles (266 Fed., 876), and Black v. Bolen (268 Fed., 427),
in each of which it was held that it was not necessary to file a claim for refund
after payment of the tax before commencing suit for its recovery where the tax
was paid under protest and the commissioner had previously ruled that the tax
should be paid.
This line of cases was expressly referred to in the case of Rock Island R. R.
v. U. S. (254 U. S., 141), and it was there clearly held that the words “on
appeal to him made” meant an appeal after payment. The following lan
guage was used:
“Men must turn square corners when they deal with the government. If
it attaches even purely formal conditions to its consent to be sued those con
ditions must be complied with. Lex non praecipit inutilia (Co. Lit., 127b)
expresses rather an ideal than an accomplished fact. But in this case we can
not pronounce the second appeal a mere form. On appeal a judge sometimes
concurs in a reversal of his decision below. It is possible, as suggested by the
court of claims, that the second appeal may be heard by a different person.
At all events, the words are there in the statute and the regulations, and the
court is of opinion that they mark the conditions of the claimant’s right.”
The rule laid down makes it clear that unless plaintiff can state a cause of
action at law which sets forth compliance with section 3226 as thus construed
by the supreme court, such action must be dismissed. The court can not,
however, at this time determine the sufficiency of such pleading, as its aver
ments may differ materially from those contained in the bill of complaint.
An order will be entered herein transferring this suit to the law side of the
court, with leave to plaintiff to file a declaration at law within 15 days from
this date; defendant to plead or file motion to dismiss within 15 days after
service of copy of such declaration has been duly made upon attorney for
defendant.
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